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1. Introductory Remarks 
In Wittgenstein’s discussion of first person psychological 
statements, we find a number of remarks that point to a 
semantic difficulty in the use of such ascriptions. The 
meaning ambiguity is due to the fact that one and the 
same proposition can both be used to state a matter of fact 
and a metaphysical assumption. Hence a sentence such 
as, e.g., “Only my pain is real pain” might mean that all 
others except me are only pretending. In a solipsistic 
context, however, the claim is supposed to express that 
nobody except me can be in pain.  
One of the problems involved in such usages lies, ac-
cording to Wittgenstein, in our constant confusion and 
change of these two different cases (cf. Wittgenstein 1993, 
288). This paper only concentrates on the plurivalent 
appliances of the word “I” and a possible way to avoid 
such ambiguities by introducing semantic rules that pro-
vide different linguistic settings for empirical and meta-
physical contexts.  
Since the discussion of whether “I” is a referring expres-
sion has been one of the most important and outstanding 
questions in the writings on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, 
essential problems have to be left unmentioned. The main 
part of this contribution is therefore restricted to various 
uses of the first person pronoun, some of which are mod-
eled on cases where the “I” does refer to some entity and 
others where the question of reference does not arise.  
2. Case differentiations 
In The Blue and Brown Books Wittgenstein distinguishes a 
subjective and an objective use of the word “I”. Examples 
of the latter would be sentences like “I am six feet tall”, “I 
broke my arm” etc. Here, identification of a particular per-
son is needed, including possible errors. The former use of 
“I” is restricted to psychological predications such as “I see 
so and so”, “I am in pain” etc. In this case no particular 
person is recognized as being the one who is in pain or 
sees so and so. This difference, however, might lead one 
to assume that the pronoun refers to some mental sub-
stance of a Cartesian kind. Wittgenstein remarks: “We feel 
then that in the cases in which ‘I’ is used as subject, we 
don’t use it because we recognize a particular person by 
his bodily characteristics; and this creates the illusion that 
we use this word to refer to something bodiless, which, 
however, has its seat in our body. In fact this seems to be 
the real ego, the one of which it was said, ‘Cogito, ergo 
sum’” (Wittgenstein, 1972, 69-70). Now, one way to avoid 
the assumption could be to eliminate the word “I” in sub-
jective usages. This, however, also requires case differen-
tiations within such contexts, granted the thesis of a se-
mantic dichotomy equally holds for subjective applications.  
The first case we could call a “quasi-objective” one. In 
the Blue Book Wittgenstein argues that there are instances 
where I say “I” and point to my body analogous to situa-
tions where we say “she is in pain” when she cries, is 
covered in blood etc.: “If, in saying ‘I’, I point to my own 
body, I model the use of the word ‘I’ on that of the demon-
strative ‘this person’ or ‘he’” (Wittgenstein 1972, 68). But 
this seems to show that here we have a case, where the 
first person pronoun is used in order to refer to a particular 
person. And there are certainly situations where someone 
wants to inform, say a doctor, about his physical conditions 
or insists on being the first to be helped because he is in 
serious pain whereas all the others are only slightly in-
jured. It is important to notice, however, that the I is not 
reducible to a particular body for I could, e.g., imagine to 
change my body. Nonetheless, the expression has no 
sense without reference to a body (cf. Ambrose 1979, 62). 
This point reminds one of Wittgenstein’s discussion of 
mental predicates. Here, too, he argues that they cannot 
be replaced by a behaviouristic terminology although they 
get their sense only by reference to corresponding observ-
able phenomena. 
The second use we might call “quasi-expressive”. What 
characterizes these cases of “I”-applications is the as-
sumption that first person predications are not to be taken 
as descriptions of certain conditions but rather as substitu-
tions of natural expressions such as “ouch” in the case of “I 
am in pain”, or as Wittgenstein puts it: “To say, ‘I have 
pain’ is no more a statement about a particular person 
than moaning is” (Wittgenstein 1972, 67) or “The differ-
ence between the propositions ‘I have pain’ and ‘he has 
pain’ is not that of ‘L.W. has pain’ and ‘Smith has pain’. 
Rather, it corresponds to the difference between moaning 
and saying that someone moans” (Wittgenstein 1972, 68). 
Here we can see that this form of subjective use is mod-
eled on contexts of non-descriptive natural expressions, 
i.e. cases where the question of reference does not arise 
because no referential terms are involved.  
The third and most interesting case of metaphysical us-
age, however, does not, it seems, correspond to any 
analogous applications of the above kinds. But as already 
mentioned, the fact that we apply the word “I” without 
recognizing a particular person by her bodily features 
might create the illusion, that instead we indirectly refer to 
some mental Cartesian substance that justifies our saying 
“I”. What is most important here to see is not the denial of 
such a self but rather that it cannot warrant the use of our 
first person pronoun. Wittgenstein remarks: “– ‘Is there 
then no mind, but only a body?’ Answer: The word ‘mind’ 
has meaning, i.e., it has a use in our language; but saying 
this doesn’t yet say what kind of use we make of it” (Witt-
genstein 1972, 69). Although this remark does not tell us 
what kind of use Wittgenstein is appealing to, it seems 
clear that the meaning of the word “I” in metaphysical 
contexts is not some bearer it denotes.  
Now, to avoid the semantic dichotomy between empiri-
cal and metaphysical contexts, Wittgenstein offers a pos-
sible solution by introducing a new conceptual framework 
based on a set of rules different from our everday usage. 
3. Introduction of an alternative symbolism 
A solipsist who argues that only his pain is real pain is 
certainly not stating a matter of fact for his point is that it is 
logically impossible for anyone except him to be in pain, or 
in other words, a sentence that claims that a person A, 
who is not the solipsist, feels pain is without meaning. In 
these metaphysical contexts, where the “I” is without a 
counterpart, it is, however, equally nonsense to say that I 
am in pain, for here the use of the first person pronoun is 
not a quasi-objective one, i.e. it does not refer to any pos-




sessor having a particular experience as it does in cases 
of objective use such as “I have 5 Euro in my pocket”. In 
one of his lectures Wittgenstein mentions the following: “To 
the person who says ‘only I have real toothache’ the reply 
should be: ‘If only you can have real toothache, there is no 
sense in saying ‘Only I have toothache’. Either you don’t 
need ‘I’ or you don’t need ‘real’ … ‘I’ is no longer opposed 
to anything. You had much better say ‘There is toothache’.’ 
‘Only I have real toothache’, either has a commonsense 
meaning, or, if it is a grammatical proposition it is meant to 
be a statement of a rule” (Ambrose 1979, 22). This last 
remark obviously points out the meaning ambiguity that is 
involved in sentences stating personal experiences. Under 
usual circumstances the one who says that only she is in 
pain implies that all the others are just pretending. The 
second part of the quote, however, hints at another prob-
lem Wittgenstein ascribes to metaphysical propositions: 
Whereas the solipsist wants to say something necessarily 
true about the nature of things, e.g., the soul, all he really 
does is confusing such statements with grammatical rules 
that govern the use of words like “I”. So, the sentence 
‘Only I have real pain’ is not to be taken as a metaphysical 
claim about the essence of a self but instead as a gram-
matical sentence determining the use of our first person 
pronoun in such contexts.  
In his Notes for Lectures on ‘Private Experience’ and 
‘Sense Data’ Wittgenstein remarks: “You can’t deny that 
there is my personal experience and that this in a most 
important sense has no neighbour. – But you don’t mean 
that it happens to be alone but that its grammatical posi-
tion is that of having no neighbour” (Wittgenstein 1993, 
229). Here again, we see the distinction between an em-
pirical context where someone happens to be by himself 
accidentally as opposed to a case where the use of a 
word, say “I”, does not have an equivalent counterpart. In 
the same notes Wittgenstein points out that this asymme-
try in our way of speaking misleads us in assuming a 
similar case for the nature of things, e.g., a Cartesian Ego, 
as if language functioned as a kind of mirror image of our 
world (cf. Wittgenstein 1993, 208-209), a position that 
reminds us of the famous Tractarian Picture theory.  
Wittgenstein’s view that metaphysical statements are 
indeed nothing but grammatical sentences about the use 
of words that differs from our commonsense understanding 
allows him to introduce the idea of an alternative symbol-
ism in order to avoid such meaning ambiguities. What he 
therefore proposes is a symbolism where the first person 
pronoun is omitted from utterances containing self-referen-
tial mental ascriptions. So instead of saying, e.g., “I am in 
pain” or “I think” we could just as well say “There is pain 
here” or “it thinks”, for such changes in our symbolism do 
not leave anything out at all: “The solipsist wishes to say ‘I 
should like to put, instead of the notation ‘I have real 
toothache’ ‘There is toothache’.’ What the solipsist wants is 
not a notation in which the ego has a monopoly, but one in 
which the ego vanishes” (Ambrose 1979, 22).  
A famous objection that obviously neglects the idea of 
such an alternative rule symbolism goes something like 
this: “To say that there is pain here does not at all tell one 
who the suffering person is. What this notation lacks is the 
identification of mental experiences as belonging to the 
speaker who would usually utter: ‘I am in pain’. Only to say 
that there is pain here could mean that anyone might 
suffer who is close enough to the talking person. “  
Of course, in our ordinary way of communication a sen-
tence such as “There’s pain here” makes no sense for the 
just mentioned reasons. But what is important to notice is 
that the alternative symbolism is only introduced for meta-
physical contexts in order to avoid possible meaning am-
biguities. Therefore a new set of linguistic rules is intro-
duced that contains grammatical propositions like “Only I 
have real pain”, “Only my experiences are real” etc. On the 
basis of these rules it is, however, absolutely clear towards 
what person a sentence like “There is pain here” is di-
rected to, namely the speaker of such an utterance who 
would commonly say “I am in pain”. This is just because 
the rules determine that there can only be one person 
suffering. Hence expressions such as “I” or “real” are 
indeed superfluous, or in other words, if there is only one 
canditate for applying a particular rule to, any mentioning 
in applying it is futile. When in a chess book we read “b1-
c3” or “b1-a3” we would never object that the indication of 
this move is incomplete because it does not tell us what 
figure is supposed to make it. And this is because accord-
ing to the rules of chess there is only one piece that is 
allowed to move in such a way, i.e. the horse.  
In one of his lectures, Wittgenstein remarks the follow-
ing: “We think we describe phenomena incompletely if we 
leave out personal pronouns, as though we would thus 
omit pointing to something, the personality, which ‘I’ in our 
present language points to. But this is not so. One sym-
bolism is just as good as the next. The word ‘I’ is one 
symbol among others having a practical use and could be 
discarded when not necessary for practical speech. It does 
not stand out among all other words we use in practical life 
unless we begin using it as Descartes did” (Ambrose 1979, 
63). Here again, Wittgenstein emphasizes the misleading 
temptation to assume that because in using the word “I” 
we do not point to a particular body we instead refer to 
some kind of Cartesian Ego seated somewhere in our 
body. His proposal of an alternative symbolism is obviously 
an attempt to avoid such inclinations by eliminating the 
word “I” in contexts where one does not want to claim 
anything empirical. The reason why Wittgenstein argues 
that this symbolism is as good as any other is precisely the 
fact that a mental substance cannot work as a justification 
for applying the first person pronoun. This is a point that 
generally holds for any rules, i.e. they are arbitrary in the 
sense that they are not justifiable by anything in reality (cf. 
Moore 1993, 70pp.). Wittgenstein remarks: “There is 
nothing wrong in suggesting that the others should give 
me an exceptional place in their notation; but the justifica-
tion which I wish to give for it: that this body is now the 
seat of that which really lives – is senseless. For admit-
tedly this is not to state anything which in the ordinary 
sense is a matter of experience” (Wittgenstein 1972, 66). 
Hence, it is important to notice that the whole conception 
of an alternative symbolism is not to deny anything like 
mental states or substances which would imply that ex-
pressions referring to them are nonsensical but rather that 
the sense of such expressions is not determined by any 
entity they do or do not refer to. So, to say that the word 
“mind” has a meaning is not to say that it refers to a mind 
that justifies its use. What gives the word its meaning is the 
particular context in which it is applied and to say, e.g., 
that other people have a self might mean that they are 
alive (cf. Ambrose 1979, 62). 
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